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graduated scale based on the number of stores owned to be unconstitutional. 9 The judge in so holding said, "All persons engaged in the
operation of one or more stores or mercantile establishments within
the state of Indiana belong to the same class for occupational tax
purposes, as the plaintiff."
The North Carolina decision is opposed to the above holdings, but
it is submitted that the result is correct. The court recognizes as a
proper basis for classification the protection of the independent
merchant class.

MooRE BRYSON.
Criminal Law-Automobiles--Manslaughter-Failure to
Stop at Highway Intersection.
Defendant, in violation of a statute,' failed to stop before turning
into a highway from a side road. Just as his car straightened out in
the highway it was struck from the rear by a bus. The bus skidded,
turned over, and a passenger was killed. Defendant was charged
with manslaughter. The pavement was slippery with snow and ice,
and the defendant's car was first seen by the bus driver when it was
five or ten feet away. A person coming into the highway from the
side road could see to the left-the direction from which the bus
came-for a distance of 175 yards. Held, the purpose of the statute
is to allow motorists to gain a knowledge of conditions on the highway. Since the defendant already had such knowledge, the purpose
of the statute had been accomplished, and there was no proximate
'Jackson v. State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana et al., 38 F. (2d)
652 (S. D. Ind. 1930). AcTs IND. 1929, c. 207, §5, (The validity of the
classification in such section being the main question of the case.) is as follows: "Every person, firm, corporation, association, or copartnership opening,
establishing, operating or maintaining one or more stores or mercantile establishments, within this state, under the same general management, supervision,
or ownership, shall pay the license fees hereinafter prescribed for the privilege
of opening, etc....
The license fees hereinafter prescribed shall be as follows:
(1) Upon one store the annual license fee shall be three dollars for each
such store;
(2) Upon two stores or more, but not to exceed five stores, the annual
license fee shall be ten dollars for each such additional store;
(3) Upon each store in excess of five, but not to exceed ten, the annual
license fee shall be fifteen dollars for each such additional store;
(4) Upon each store in excess of ten, but not to exceed twenty, the annual
license fee shall be twenty dollars for each such additional store;
(5) Upon each store in excess of twenty, the annual license see shall be
twenty-five dollars for each such additional store."
'N. C. ANN. CoDE (Michie, 1927), §2621 (63).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
causal relation between the breach of the statute and the death of the
2
passenger.
A majority of the courts, frequently on the basis of a statutory
definition of the crime, hold that a simple violatiou of a statute,
resulting in a homicide, will support a conviction of manslaughter.3
Others hold there must in addition be an element of reckless disregard
for human life. 4 There is no statutory definition of manslaughter in
North Carolina. The supreme court of this state has taken the view
that a simple violation of a statute will support such a conviction if
the statute was designed to prevent injury to the person.5 It has been
intimated by the court that traffic regulations meet this condition. 6
The general purpose of the particular regulation here involved, which
authorizes the Highway Commission to designate through highways
by erecting stop signs at entrances thereto, and makes a failure to
stop at signs so erected unlawful, seems to bring it within the qualification. Apparently, this is assumed in the decision.
In construing the statute, the court comes to the conclusion that
its purpose is simply to give a driver on a side road an opportunity to
inform himself of conditions on an intersecting highway. It logically
follows that if this particular driver already had such knowledge,
compliance with the statute would have been a useless procedure
without effect on the situation, and the violation was not the proximate cause of the accident.
However, one might differ with the court's construction, which
practically nullifies this remedial statute as to "open" intersections.
The view might be taken that the duty imposed on the defendant was
not only to inform himself of conditions on the highway, but also to
act on such information; that the duty was not only to determine
whether he could enter the highway with reasonable safety to himself and others, but also not to enter unless it could be done with such
reasonable safety. It seems likely that the legislative intent was to
'State v. Satterfield, 198 N. C. 682, 153 S. E. 155 (1930).
"Kimmel v. State, 198 Ind. 444, 154 N. E. 16 (1926); State v. Schaeffer,
96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N. E. 220 (1917) ; McBride v. State, 20 Ala. App. 434,
102 So.728 (1925).
'People v. Falkovitch, 280 Ill. 321, 117 N. E. 398 (1917) ; People v. Barnes,
182 Mich. 179, 148 N. W. 400 (1914).
'State v. Vines, 93 N. C. 493 (1885) (pointing gun in sport); State v.
Turnage, 138 N. C. 566, 49 S. E. 913 (1905) (pointing gun) ; State v. Stitt,
146 N. C. 643, 61 S. E. 566, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 308 (1918) (pointing pistol);
State v. Whaley, 191 N. C. 387, 132 S. E. 6 (1926) (violating speed law).
'State v. Whaley, supra note 5.
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give traffic on a through highway the right of way 7 and prevent just
what happened in this case-a car turning from a side road into a
highway immediately in front of a car thereon. The court says,
".. . the object of the statute is not to delay or impede travel. . ....
This is no doubt true. In fact, it is probable that the legislature was
seeking to speed up travel. But it is also probable that it had in mind
travel on the main highway.
If it be admitted that the purpose of the statute was to give traffic
on main highways the right of way, the instant situation then bes
comes similar to that in the New York case of Shirley v. Larkin Co.,
in which X entered an intersection immediately in front of Y, who
had the right of way. The court there said that in disregard of the
statute, X "recklessly went on when it was his duty to wait for the
other car" and "precipitated the accident."
It is a familiar rule of bailments that when a carrier has deviated from his proper course, and goods in his possession have been
damaged, ". . . he cannot set up as an answer to the action the bare
possibility of a loss if his wrongful act had never been done."0 It is
interesting to speculate as to what would be the result if a rule analogous to this were applied in situations like the present one, and a
defendant were required to show that compliance with the statute
would not have prevented the result complained of instead of the
prosecution being required to show that compliance would have pre10
vented such result.
HuGH L. LOnDELL.

Damages-Measure of Recovery on Dissolution of
Injunction Restraining Foreclosure Sale
A recent North Carolina case raises the interesting question as to
the measure of damages that should be allowed to a defendant who
has been restrained from selling land under a power contained in a
deed of trust.'
550 (1926).
203 Iowa 906, 210 N. W.
Roe v. Kurtz, N.
'See N.
E. 751 (1924). A fact situation very similar to the
Y. 94, 145
8239
instant case is involvdd in Lasene v. Syvanen, 123 Ore. 629, 263 Pac. 59 (1928).
But cf. Teissier v. Stewart, 11 La. App. 164, 123 So. 174 (1929).
'Davis v. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716 (1830).
12, 88 N. E. 180 (1909)
"In Conrad v. Springfield Con. Ry. Co., 240 Ill.
it is said that one charged with a tort resulting from violation of an ordinance
may show in defense that compliance would not have prevented the injury
complained of.
'Gruber v. Ewbanks, 199 N. C. 335, 154 S.E. 318 (1930).

